Fed aggressive rate hikes always cause deep recession

Has China become "unavoidable" after being once labelled "uninvestable"?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brandonkoch...f0145b45b9

https://www.forbes.com/sites/hanktucker/...f148604e92
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US and china's tension is all about "money"
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no point saying that 30 years ago US should help and support india and leave china out in the jungle without help

we will see those that make the other bet how well it will turn up
https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/busine...89121.html
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Why did the Sequoia split?
VC firm Sequoia split from its India and China arms last week claiming that the funds were under portfolio conflict. Sequoia Capital's China fund, which manages assets worth $56 billion, would operate as a separate entity led by billionaire Neil Shen.3 days ago

https://www.axios.com/2023/06/06/sequoia...hina-india
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https://www.ft.com/content/9467a0f9-7618...5881ba3ecf

he venture capital giant Sequoia Capital is splitting its China business into a separate entity amid rising tensions between Washington and Beijing.

The renowned Silicon Valley group, which made bets on fast-growing tech companies such as TikTok parent ByteDance and Alibaba, said on Tuesday it would run its Chinese business as a “completely independent” entity from its US operation.

The Chinese arm will give up the Sequoia name and instead be called HongShan, a romanisation of its Chinese name, which means redwood.

The VC group will also separate its Indian and south-east Asian business into a third entity, it said, adding that the changes would take place by March next year.

Roelof Botha, managing partner of Sequoia Capital, said in an interview that a decision to break up was taken in the past few months. “It really was a very complicated decision. Over the years, we have reassessed the cost-benefit trade-off of this arrangement and whether it was the right structure for the firm. We realised it was time for this.”

Neil Shen, the billionaire founder of Sequoia China, told the Financial Times: “There’s much less in common now” between the different Sequoia entities. He said conversations about splitting the businesses “have been evolving over the last two to three years”.

The split marks an end to one of the most successful US-China investing alliances. It has reaped rewards for the American mother ship and seeded generations of Chinese tech companies since Shen launched Sequoia China in 2005 as an arm of Sequoia Capital.

Shen has raised billions of dollars from US investors as recently as last year and has been confronted with the delicate task of investing in Beijing’s priority areas such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, while staying on the right side of Washington’s push to introduce controls on exporting sensitive technologies to China.

Sequoia’s China and India arms are run independently but share some of their profits among the global group. That will no longer be the case after the separation, and Sequoia Capital will no longer invest alongside the China and India funds in future. Sequoia Capital will retain its relationship with its long-term capital fund called Heritage and its hedge fund unit called Global Equities.

The investment group has been buffeted by a tech downturn on both sides of the Pacific. Beijing’s campaign to rein in its largest tech companies has tamed many of the internet groups Sequoia China funded and profited from, while Sequoia US last year apologised to its fund investors over its disastrous investment in failed crypto exchange FTX.

“It has become increasingly complex to run a decentralised global investment business,” the group told investors on Tuesday. “We will move to completely independent partnerships and become distinct firms with separate brands no later than March 31 2024.”

Shen said: “We shared a brand — and now we are saying no brand sharing and no centralised back office.”

Sequoia Capital China raised $9bn across several funds last year, from investors including California’s Calpers, the biggest US public pension fund, as well as Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Trust and Canada’s CDPQ and CPP Investments, according to the data provider PitchBook.

The funds were raised from investors independently of the US team. Half of the capital came from US investors, while the rest came from global pension funds and other institutional investors, according to a person involved.

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Sequoia China’s large US investor base has made the company more cautious in backing fledgling Chinese groups in sensitive sectors such as semiconductors. Last year, the group began consulting with outside policy experts before making such investments and people close to it said it would continue to do so after the split.

The geopolitical tensions and close association with the US have put Shen in a tough position domestically. In a speech and proposals to China’s top political consultative body last year, Shen said that Beijing had to prioritise developing robotics and green energy, which many interpreted as trying to align Sequoia China with Beijing’s priorities.

But this year, he was not appointed to a second term in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body full of political heavyweights.

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Sequoia Capital to spin off its China business

Internet groups Sequoia China has backed have also faced challenges from Beijing’s tech crackdown. Meituan was hit with a large antitrust fine, while ride-hailing group Didi was forced to delist from the New York Stock Exchange. China has also installed an official to oversee ByteDance’s main Chinese entity.

The largest blow for Sequoia China came with Beijing’s clampdown on online education companies in 2021 when officials overnight moved to make illegal the business models of many up-and-coming start-ups. The rules have dented its large investments in groups such as Zuoyebang and VIPKID.
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china红山, india黑山 US白山
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when Us print money during 2021 us' covid 19

JP Morgan and Nuveen team up for S$1.28bn Singapore office buy


https://realassets.ipe.com/news/jp-morga...59.article
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a tiny island only need to monitor what the super power do with the business,military and financial and technology as they can reshape this dot into nothing
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as us fed keep hiking rates more than 11 times
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VoGPN3hawM
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how us affect us
https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/fed-l...023-05-03/

we stay out of stocks and currencies and go into hiding in t bills
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before the us regional banks collapsed in 2023
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/14/citi-to-...nesia.html
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2023 is a very volatile years where US had to top up its coffer by selling trillion of bills and more us regional banks will be hit so to steady steady blow pee
https://investmentmoats.com/saving-and-i...an-savers/
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or spend elsewhere

Name Symbol Last Open High Low Chg. Chg. % Vol. Time
SGD/AUD 1.0943 1.1010 1.0995 1.0943 -0.0027 -0.25% - 23:55:40
SGD/THB 25.9046 25.8166 25.9405 25.8348 +0.0413 +0.16% - 23:55:44
SGD/IDR 11,120.66 11,078.00 11,126.24 11,094.70 +8.20 +0.07% - 23:55:42
USD/SGD 1.3443 1.3408 1.3455 1.3405 +0.0034 +0.26% - 23:55:49
SGD/MYR 3.4482 3.4437 3.4494 3.4420 +0.0053 +0.15% - 23:55:49
SGD/CNY 5.3363 5.3403 5.3426 5.3317 -0.0042 -0.08% - 23:55:40
EUR/SGD 1.4535 1.4488 1.4549 1.4526 +0.0004 +0.03% - 23:55:38
HKD/SGD 0.1717 0.1714 0.1718 0.1712 +0.0004 +0.23% - 23:55:04
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https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/currency/usdcny

https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/2023062...c-cuts-lpr
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your money versus the "de-dollarised USD"
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/in...dollar.asp
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we need a global recession as deep as 2008 or march 202o before US will start to cut rates so the world must work together to create the situation that the US will have no choice to cut rates
https://www.blackrock.com/us/financial-p...-hikes-end
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when US hike rates more than 10 times after march 2022
Including private investors and governments, the top three estimated foreign holders of federal debt by country, as of December 2022, are Japan ($1.1 trillion), China ($0.9 trillion), and the United Kingdom ($0.7 trillion).9 Jun 2023
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS22331.pdf

their us debts price fall after each 05% or 0.25% rate hikes and they kept losing their money in bond price
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Foreign Investment in U.S. Federal Debt:
Why Is It an Issue of Concern?
From an economic perspective, foreign holdings of federal debt can be viewed in the broader
context of U.S. saving, investment, and borrowing from abroad. For decades, the United States
has saved less than it invests. Domestic saving is composed of saving by U.S. households,
businesses, and governments. By accounting identity,7 when the government runs budget deficits,
it reduces domestic saving. By the same accounting identity, the shortfall between U.S. saving
and physical investment is met by borrowing from abroad. When the deficit rises (i.e., public
saving falls), U.S. investment must fall (referred to as the deficit crowding out investment) or
borrowing from abroad must rise. If capital were fully mobile and unlimited, a larger deficit
would be fully matched by greater borrowing from abroad, and there would be no crowding out
of domestic investment. To be a net borrower from abroad, the United States must run a trade
deficit (i.e., it must buy more imports from foreigners than it sells in exports to foreigners).8 Since
2000, U.S. borrowing from abroad and the trade deficit have each exceeded $300 billion each
year. Borrowing from abroad peaked at about $800 billion in 2006 and was approximately $677
billion in 2022.9 Borrowing from abroad has occurred through foreign purchases of both U.S.
government and U.S. private securities and other assets.
As a result of foreign purchases of Treasury securities, the federal government must send U.S.
income abroad to foreigners. If the overall economy is larger as a result of federal borrowing
(because the borrowing stimulated economic recovery10 or was used to productively add to the
U.S. capital stock, for example), then this outcome may leave the United States better off overallon net despite the transfer of income abroad. In other words, without foreign borrowing, U.S.
income would be lower than it currently is net of foreign interest payments in this scenario.
It can be argued that the underlying long-term economic issue is the budget deficit itself and not
that the deficit is financed in part by foreigners. This can be illustrated by the counterfactual.
Assume the same budget deficits and U.S. saving rates without the possibility of foreign
borrowing. In this case, budget deficits would have had a much greater crowding-out effect on
U.S. private investment, because only domestic saving would have been available to finance both.
The pressures the deficit has placed on domestic saving would have pushed up interest rates
throughout the economy and caused fewer private investment projects to be profitably
undertaken. With fewer private investment projects, overall GDP would have been lower over
time relative to what it would have been. The ability to borrow from foreigners avoids the
deleterious effects on U.S. interest rates, private investment, and GDP, to an extent, even if it
means that the returns on some of this investment now flow to foreigners instead of Americans. In
other words, all else equal, foreign purchases of Treasury securities reduce the federal
government’s borrowing costs and reduce the costs the deficit imposes on the broader economy.
The burden of a foreign-financed deficit is borne by exporters and import-competing businesses,
because borrowing from abroad necessitates a trade deficit. It is also borne by future generations,
because future interest payments will require income transfers to foreigners.11 To the extent that
the deficit crowds out private investment rather than being financed through foreign borrowing,
its burden is also borne by future generations through an otherwise smaller GDP. Because interest
rates were at historically low levels from the 2008 financial crisis to 2022, this burden had not
grown significantly given the increase in borrowing. Rates have risen since then, however, and
the burden has been rising with some lag as new borrowing has been made at the new higher rates
and old borrowing has matured and rolled over into new debt instruments with higher rates.12
Thus far, this report has considered the impact of the government’s budget deficit and the low
U.S. saving rate on U.S. Treasury yields but not investor demand. Since interest rates fell to
historic lows at a time when the supply of Treasury securities rose to historic heights, it follows
that Treasury rates have been driven mainly by increased investor demand in recent years. In the
wake of the 2008 financial crisis and again during the COVID-19 pandemic, investor demand for
Treasury securities increased as investors undertook a flight to safety. Treasury securities are
perceived as a safe haven compared with other assets because of low perceived default risk and
greater liquidity (i.e., the ability to sell quickly and at low cost) than virtually any alternative
asset. For foreign investors, their behavior also implies that they view the risk from exchange rate
changes of holding dollar-denominated assets to be lower than alternative assets denominated in
other currencies. The reasons for this flight to safety are varied. For example, investors who had
previously held more risky assets may become more averse to risk and seek to minimize their loss
exposure; investors may not see profitable private investment opportunities and choose to hold
their wealth in Treasury securities as a store of value until those opportunities arise; or investors
may need Treasury securities to post as collateral for certain types of transactions (such as
repurchase agreements) where previously other types of collateral could be used (or used at low
cost).
Flight-to-safety considerations have subsided as economic conditions have normalized, reducing
the incentive for foreigners to buy Treasuries and raising their yields, all else equal. But TreasuryForeign Holdings of Federal Debt
Congressional Research Service 7
securities are also sought out by international investors because of the dollar’s unique role as the
world’s reserve currency. As a result, Treasury securities are in permanent demand as underlying
collateral in financial transactions and as a temporary store of value while trade or financial
transactions are being executed.
More normal economic conditions would also be expected to increase domestic investment
demand, which would either push up domestic interest rates or lead to more foreign borrowing.
This relative movement in rates could attract additional foreign capital inflows.
Additionally, any discussion of foreign holdings of Treasuries would be incomplete without a
discussion of the large holdings of foreign governments (referred to as foreign official holdings in
Figure 3).13 Foreign official holdings are motivated primarily by a desire for a liquid and stable
store of value for foreign reserves. Relatively few assets besides U.S. Treasury securities fill this
role well. Depending on the country, foreign reserves may be accumulated as a result of a
country’s exchange rate policy, the desire to reinvest export proceeds, or the desire to build a war
chest to fend off speculation against the country’s exchange rate and securities. If motivated by
any of these factors, rate of return may be a lesser consideration for foreign governments than it is
for a private investor, although large, foreign official holdings have not been significantly
increasing since 2013—and fell in 2022—after more than a decade of rapid growth before then.
Since 1986, the United States has had a net foreign debt, and that debt was roughly $16.1 trillion
in 2022.14 Additional growth in net foreign debt would be unsustainable in the long run if it grows
faster than GDP, as it has generally done in recent decades. This net foreign debt has not imposed
any burden on Americans thus far, however, because the United States has consistently earned
more income on its foreign assets than it has paid on its foreign debt, even though foreigners
owned more U.S. assets than Americans owned foreign assets. Although it is likely that the
United States would begin to make net debt payments to foreigners at some point if the net
foreign debt were to continue to grow, it has not occurred yet. To date, the primary drawback is
the risk that its unsustainable growth poses, although that risk is slight in the short run.
Unsustainable growth in the net foreign debt could lead to foreigners at some point reevaluating
and reducing their U.S. asset holdings. If this happened suddenly, it could lead to financial
instability and a sharp decline in the dollar’s value. Alternatively, were the growth in the debt to
decline gradually, it is unlikely to be destabilizing.15
A related concern is whether the major role of foreigners in Treasury markets adds more risk to
financial stability. In other words, would financial stability be less at risk if the United States
borrowed the same amount from foreigners, but foreigners invested exclusively in private
securities instead of U.S. Treasury securities? Empirical evidence does not shed much light on
this question, although the fact that some foreign countries that experienced debt crises, such as
Ireland, had accumulated mainly private, not government, debts might suggest that avoiding
foreign ownership of government debt is not a panacea. Although countries such as Greece withForeign Holdings of Federal Debt
Congressional Research Service 8
large foreign holdings of government debt have experienced financing problems, a large share of
Italy’s large government debt was held domestically, and it has nevertheless faced financingproblems. The major role of foreign governments as holders of U.S. Treasuries could reduce
financial instability if foreign governments are less motivated by rate-of-return concerns, because
that implies they would be less likely to sell their holdings if prices started to fall. Finally, foreign
official holdings of U.S. debt may have foreign policy (as opposed to economic) implications that
are beyond the scope of this report.
What policy options exist if policymakers decided foreign ownership of federal debt is
undesirable? Absent strict capital controls, it is unlikely that foreigners could effectively be
prevented from buying Treasury securities. After Treasury securities are initially auctioned by
Treasury, they are traded on diffused and international secondary markets, and turnover is much
higher on secondary markets than on initial auctions. A foreign ban on secondary markets would
be hard to enforce because secondary market activity could shift overseas, and even if it could be
enforced, the U.S. saving-investment imbalance would likely shift foreign investment into other
U.S. securities—perhaps even newly created financial products that allowed foreigners to
indirectly invest in Treasury securities. Thus, a ban would not address the underlying economic
factors driving foreign purchases. Economically, the only way the U.S. government could reduce
its reliance on foreign borrowing is by raising the U.S. saving rate, which could be done most
directly by reducing budget deficits. Reducing deficits too quickly could be counterproductive however, if it undermined an economic recovery
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