22-08-2022, 01:18 PM
kepcorp share playing catch up to sembcorp share soon
https://www.dbs.com.sg/treasures/aics/st...KEP_SP.xml
https://www.dbs.com.sg/treasures/aics/st...KEP_SP.xml
![](https://i.imgur.com/CLvY2jA.png")
Fed aggressive rate hikes always cause deep recession
22-08-2022, 03:33 PM
the poor will buy from the middle class when they have no buying power when this happen the rich will be able to buy more as they have higher buying power
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapor...ns-2866886
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapor...ns-2866886
22-08-2022, 03:37 PM
for example those that invest in sembmarine cut stakes in sembmarine during the two rights and buy injto sembcorp at below $1 while those have just enough money will have to cut loss and lick the bad wounds
22-08-2022, 04:15 PM
22-08-2022, 04:23 PM
22-08-2022, 04:25 PM
22-08-2022, 04:30 PM
22-08-2022, 04:36 PM
if we take the view that inflation is here to stay for a long time, the fed will have to hike rates many times to crash the economy to bring time inflation and stop consumers from further spending then it is good to learn from
http://finance.sina.com.cn/financecommen...2741.shtml
http://finance.sina.com.cn/financecommen...2741.shtml
22-08-2022, 04:40 PM
the policy after 2020 is to bring back manufacturing from low cost producing region to higher cost producing region and to buy from friendly countries that produce at higher cost so as a result products will be costly and so consumers will have to pay more until they have no more purchasing power(from globalisation to anti-globalisation make US big again mindset)
24-08-2022, 10:15 AM
current price of kepcorp share at 24/8/2022 vs offer price of $7.35 in 2019
https://www.straitstimes.com/business/co...hare-offer
which is more attractive?
https://www.straitstimes.com/business/co...hare-offer
which is more attractive?
24-08-2022, 10:19 AM
25-08-2022, 05:22 AM
Central bankers worry that the recent surge in inflation may represent not a temporary phenomenon but a transition to a new, lasting reality.
To counter the impact of a decline in global commerce and persistent shortages of labor, commodities and energy, central bankers might lift interest rates higher and for longer than in recent decades—which could result in weaker economic growth, higher unemployment and more frequent recessions.
The Federal Reserve’s current round of interest-rate increases, which economists say have pushed the U.S. to the brink of a recession, could be a taste of this new environment.
“The global economy is undergoing a series of major transitions,” said Mark Carney, former Bank of Canada and Bank of England governor, in a speech at an economics conference in March. “The long era of low inflation, suppressed volatility and easy financial conditions is ending.”
Consumer prices, change from a year earlier
U.S.
EUROZONE
U.K.
10
%
8
6
Target rate for
many central banks
4
2
0
-2
2000
2000
2000
’10
’20
’10
’20
’10
’20
Note: U.S. inflation refers to the PCE index and is through June 2022. Eurozone and U.K. data is through July 2022.
Sources: Commerce Department (U.S.); Eurostat (Eurozone); Office for National Statistics (U.K.)
This new era would mark an abrupt about-face after a decade in which central bankers worried more about the prospects of anemic economic growth and too-low inflation, and used monetary policy to spur expansions. It also would be a reversal for investors accustomed to low interest rates.
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Real Time Economics
The latest economic news, analysis and data curated weekdays by WSJ's Jeffrey Sparshott.
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The challenges for policy makers will take center stage from Thursday to Saturday when they gather for the Kansas City Fed’s annual retreat in Jackson Hole, Wyo., being held in person for the first time since 2019.
The Fed could still succeed at curbing inflation by raising interest rates. Postpandemic headwinds might abate or fail to materialize if protectionism and geopolitical risks recede, labor productivity improves, a slowdown in China’s economy reduces demand for global commodities, or new technologies reduce the costs of developing new energy sources.
Mr. Powell with Mark Carney, then Bank of England Governor, in Jackson Hole, Wyo., in 2019.
PHOTO: AMBER BAESLER/ASSOCIATED PRESS
“Since the pandemic, we’ve been living in a world where the economy is being driven by very different forces,” Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said on a June panel discussion in Portugal. “What we don’t know is whether we will be going back to something that looks more like, or a little bit like, what we had before.”
European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde on the panel offered a more pessimistic appraisal: “I don’t think that we are going to go back to that environment of low inflation.”
The new environment reflects the stalling or potential reversal of three forces that pushed inflation down in recent decades by limiting workers’ ability to win higher wages and companies’ ability to raise prices.
ADVERTISEMENT
• Force 1: Globalization. Increased flows of trade, money, people and ideas flourished with the Cold War’s end and China’s entry into the international trading system in the 1990s. Multinational companies using new technologies constructed global supply chains focused on driving down costs by finding the cheapest place and workers to produce products. Worldwide competition drove prices lower for many goods.
This helped keep U.S. inflation stable. Over the 20 years that ended in 2019, U.S. goods prices rose an average of 0.4% a year, while services prices grew 2.6% annually, leaving “core inflation”—which excludes volatile food and energy prices—around 1.7%.
After the pandemic and the Ukraine war disrupted supply chains, many business leaders adopted new processes to increase reliability even if they cost more, such as by moving production closer to home or buying from multiple suppliers. And tensions between Western democracies and Russia and China raise concerns about a possible further retreat from globalization and rise of protectionism, which would raise production costs.
“If you had all of your supply chain in just one country, you have to question why take that risk in a world where pandemics could hit or country relations could deteriorate or wars could happen between countries,” said Richmond Fed President Tom Barkin, a former McKinsey & Co. executive. It is difficult to predict just how durable such changes will be, he added.
• Force 2: Labor markets. In an August 2020 book, “The Great Demographic Reversal,” former British central banker Charles Goodhart and economist Manoj Pradhan argued that the low inflation since the 1990s had less to do with central-bank policies and more with the addition of hundreds of millions of low-wage Asian and Eastern European workers, which held down labor costs and prices of manufactured goods exported to richer countries.
A farmworker adjusts sprinklers in Ventura County, Calif., in 2021.
PHOTO: PATRICK T. FALLON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Mr. Goodhart wrote that global labor glut was giving way to an era of worker shortages, and hence higher inflation.
Meanwhile, the U.S. labor force has roughly 2.5 million fewer workers since the pandemic began, compared with what it would have if the prepandemic trend in workforce participation had continued and after accounting for the aging of the population, according to an analysis by Didem Tüzemen, an economist at the Kansas City Fed. Its growth had already slowed before Covid-19, reflecting an aging population, declining birthrates and less immigration. The slower growth rate of the U.S. workforce could force wages higher, feeding inflation.
Wages rose about 3% annually before the pandemic. Average hourly earnings grew 5.2% in the year ended in July.
ADVERTISEMENT
Missing Workers
Slower population growth and an aging workforce don’t explain all of the U.S. labor-force losses since the pandemic, according to a Kansas City Fed analysis. About two million workers are still missing compared with estimates that account for those factors.
U.S. labor-force level and alternate projections starting in March 2020
169 million
Growth at
2015-19 pace
Dotted lines are estimates
Without impacts of
aging labor force and
declining population
growth
166
163
Without impacts of
declining population
growth
160
Labor-force level
157
154
2015
’16
’17
’18
’19
’20
’21
’22
Note: Population adjustments assume the U.S. population grew at its 2015–19 pace after February 2020. Aging adjustments assume the population shares of different demographic groups did not change from February 2020 levels.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City analysis of Census Bureau data
Roughly a million people moved to the U.S. annually in the years after the 2007-09 recession. That pace began to taper during the Trump administration and turned into a trickle after the pandemic started. The slowdown left the U.S. with 1.8 million fewer immigrants of working age—about 0.9% of the working-age population—than if pre-2019 immigration trends had continued, according to research by Giovanni Peri, a labor economist at the University of California, Davis.
Mr. Powell in a May interview pointed to the potential for reduced immigration to create a “persistent imbalance between supply and demand in the labor market.” He added: “If you have a slower growing labor market, you’re going to have a smaller economy.”
• Force 3: Energy, commodity prices. Energy and commodity firms haven’t heavily invested in new production over the past decade, creating risks of more persistent shortages when global demand is growing. When the Fed broke the back of high inflation in the early 1980s, then-Chairman Paul Volcker enjoyed some helpful tailwinds in the form of decadelong investments in oil.
Before the emergence of these three factors, the Fed could raise rates at a leisurely pace and could pursue policies that simultaneously kept unemployment and inflation low, something economists later dubbed the “divine coincidence.”
That was possible when the main threats to the economy were “demand shocks”—pullbacks in hiring, consumer spending and business investment—which slow both inflation and growth, as in the recessions of 2001 and 2007-09.
Ben Bernanke, then Fed chairman, testifies on Capitol Hill in 2008.
PHOTO: SUSAN WALSH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Fed cut rates to near zero in 2008 to stimulate economic activity, held them there until 2015, then raised them at a glacial pace by historical standards. The unemployment rate fell below 4% in 2018, and inflation stayed at or just below the central bank’s 2% target. After raising the fed-funds rate to around 2.4% at the end of 2018, Mr. Powell cut rates slightly following a growth scare in 2019.
Those experiences heavily shaped the Fed’s initial response to the pandemic in 2020. Fearing another decade of sluggish growth and too-low inflation, it cut rates to near zero and promised to keep providing stimulus even after the White House and Congress aggressively boosted federal spending.
‘Supply shocks’
Rather than reducing economic demand, the forces that emerged during the pandemic were what economists call “supply shocks”—events that curtail the economy’s ability to provide goods and services, which in turn hurt growth and spurred inflation. Covid-19 lockdowns and stronger demand for goods disrupted supply chains, as did Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the West’s financial counterassault. Labor shortages emerged across the U.S.
With supply shocks, the Fed faces a harder trade-off between growth and inflation, because attacking inflation invariably means damping growth and employment. In such an environment, “there is no divine coincidence anymore,” said Jean Boivin, a former Bank of Canada official who heads the BlackRock Investment Institute.
The Fed and most other central banks initially misread the economy because, in early 2021, price increases could be traced clearly to the effects of the pandemic, affecting a small number of goods, such as used cars. By the end of the year, however, higher inflation had become increasingly broad-based.
One measure produced by the Dallas Fed, called a “trimmed mean” annual inflation rate, which excludes the most volatile categories to capture an underlying trend, rose from 2% last August to 3.5% in January and 4.3% in June.
“This is looking like the 1990s turned on its head,” said Stephen Cecchetti, a Brandeis University economics professor. “Every forecaster back then underestimated growth and overestimated inflation systemically for almost the whole decade. Now, it looks like we’re in for the reverse of this, which will be very, very unpleasant because it means we’re suddenly going to hit trade-offs.”
A wheat field burns after Russian shelling in Ukraine in July.
PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The low-inflation environment of the past 30 years caused consumers and businesses to not think much about price increases. Fed officials now worry that even if prices rise temporarily, consumers and businesses could come to expect higher inflation to persist. That could help fuel higher inflation as workers demand higher pay that employers would pass onto consumers through higher prices.
“The risk is that because of a multiplicity of shocks, you start to transition to a higher-inflation regime,’’ Mr. Powell said on the June panel. “Our job is literally to prevent that from happening. And we will prevent that from happening.”
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
How should the Federal Reserve respond to higher inflationary pressures? Join the conversation below.
Last year, Mr. Powell suggested he was skeptical of the idea that the forces underpinning globalization would shift overnight, as Mr. Goodhart suggested. But he has given more attention to the idea in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, which has highlighted the potential for significant economic and financial fallout from geopolitical conflicts.
By sending inflation, and especially energy prices, to such elevated levels, the war could serve as a trigger “to make people realize that inflation—and quite high inflation—is a real possibility,” said Mr. Goodhart. In turn, that could weaken the public’s confidence that “everything will go back to normal.”
“The argument of central banks, that they will get inflation back to target at 2% two years from now, is becoming increasingly implausible because they’ve said that all along and, of course, they haven’t achieved it,” he said.
ADVERTISEMENT
Recession risk
The Fed’s aggressive interest-rate increases this year could be the first example of what happens with U.S. monetary policy in this new environment. Faster and bigger rate rises create greater risks of recession and could upend popular investment strategies by leading to more frequent losses for the two main components of traditional asset portfolios—stocks and long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.
The closed doors of the Pasadena, Calif., community job center during the coronavirus outbreak in May 2020.
PHOTO: DAMIAN DOVARGANES/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Fed officials have raised the fed-funds rate by a cumulative 2.25 percentage points this year, the fastest pace since they began using the rate as their primary policy-setting tool in the early 1990s. The rate influences other borrowing costs throughout the economy.
The Fed began with a quarter-point increase in March, followed by a half-point rise in May and increases of 0.75 point each in June and in July. At their meeting last month, officials debated how and when to dial back the pace of those increases, according to minutes of the meeting released Aug. 17.
An important shift occurred between Fed officials’ May and June meetings, when Mr. Powell secured consensus that they would need to raise rates high enough to slow growth. Through the summer, Fed officials have been unusually united over their goal, but if the labor market cools and the economy slows, Mr. Powell could face a trickier task forging agreement.
Several former Fed officials who have worked closely with Mr. Powell say he is likely to err on the side of raising rates too much, rather than too little, because tolerating excessive inflation would represent a much greater institutional failure for the central bank. Mr. Powell has hammered home the primacy of lowering inflation to the Fed’s 2% target.
“We can’t fail on this,” Mr. Powell told lawmakers on June 23, describing the Fed’s commitment as “unconditional.”
To counter the impact of a decline in global commerce and persistent shortages of labor, commodities and energy, central bankers might lift interest rates higher and for longer than in recent decades—which could result in weaker economic growth, higher unemployment and more frequent recessions.
The Federal Reserve’s current round of interest-rate increases, which economists say have pushed the U.S. to the brink of a recession, could be a taste of this new environment.
“The global economy is undergoing a series of major transitions,” said Mark Carney, former Bank of Canada and Bank of England governor, in a speech at an economics conference in March. “The long era of low inflation, suppressed volatility and easy financial conditions is ending.”
Consumer prices, change from a year earlier
U.S.
EUROZONE
U.K.
10
%
8
6
Target rate for
many central banks
4
2
0
-2
2000
2000
2000
’10
’20
’10
’20
’10
’20
Note: U.S. inflation refers to the PCE index and is through June 2022. Eurozone and U.K. data is through July 2022.
Sources: Commerce Department (U.S.); Eurostat (Eurozone); Office for National Statistics (U.K.)
This new era would mark an abrupt about-face after a decade in which central bankers worried more about the prospects of anemic economic growth and too-low inflation, and used monetary policy to spur expansions. It also would be a reversal for investors accustomed to low interest rates.
NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP
Real Time Economics
The latest economic news, analysis and data curated weekdays by WSJ's Jeffrey Sparshott.
Preview
Subscribe
The challenges for policy makers will take center stage from Thursday to Saturday when they gather for the Kansas City Fed’s annual retreat in Jackson Hole, Wyo., being held in person for the first time since 2019.
The Fed could still succeed at curbing inflation by raising interest rates. Postpandemic headwinds might abate or fail to materialize if protectionism and geopolitical risks recede, labor productivity improves, a slowdown in China’s economy reduces demand for global commodities, or new technologies reduce the costs of developing new energy sources.
Mr. Powell with Mark Carney, then Bank of England Governor, in Jackson Hole, Wyo., in 2019.
PHOTO: AMBER BAESLER/ASSOCIATED PRESS
“Since the pandemic, we’ve been living in a world where the economy is being driven by very different forces,” Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said on a June panel discussion in Portugal. “What we don’t know is whether we will be going back to something that looks more like, or a little bit like, what we had before.”
European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde on the panel offered a more pessimistic appraisal: “I don’t think that we are going to go back to that environment of low inflation.”
The new environment reflects the stalling or potential reversal of three forces that pushed inflation down in recent decades by limiting workers’ ability to win higher wages and companies’ ability to raise prices.
ADVERTISEMENT
• Force 1: Globalization. Increased flows of trade, money, people and ideas flourished with the Cold War’s end and China’s entry into the international trading system in the 1990s. Multinational companies using new technologies constructed global supply chains focused on driving down costs by finding the cheapest place and workers to produce products. Worldwide competition drove prices lower for many goods.
This helped keep U.S. inflation stable. Over the 20 years that ended in 2019, U.S. goods prices rose an average of 0.4% a year, while services prices grew 2.6% annually, leaving “core inflation”—which excludes volatile food and energy prices—around 1.7%.
After the pandemic and the Ukraine war disrupted supply chains, many business leaders adopted new processes to increase reliability even if they cost more, such as by moving production closer to home or buying from multiple suppliers. And tensions between Western democracies and Russia and China raise concerns about a possible further retreat from globalization and rise of protectionism, which would raise production costs.
“If you had all of your supply chain in just one country, you have to question why take that risk in a world where pandemics could hit or country relations could deteriorate or wars could happen between countries,” said Richmond Fed President Tom Barkin, a former McKinsey & Co. executive. It is difficult to predict just how durable such changes will be, he added.
• Force 2: Labor markets. In an August 2020 book, “The Great Demographic Reversal,” former British central banker Charles Goodhart and economist Manoj Pradhan argued that the low inflation since the 1990s had less to do with central-bank policies and more with the addition of hundreds of millions of low-wage Asian and Eastern European workers, which held down labor costs and prices of manufactured goods exported to richer countries.
A farmworker adjusts sprinklers in Ventura County, Calif., in 2021.
PHOTO: PATRICK T. FALLON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Mr. Goodhart wrote that global labor glut was giving way to an era of worker shortages, and hence higher inflation.
Meanwhile, the U.S. labor force has roughly 2.5 million fewer workers since the pandemic began, compared with what it would have if the prepandemic trend in workforce participation had continued and after accounting for the aging of the population, according to an analysis by Didem Tüzemen, an economist at the Kansas City Fed. Its growth had already slowed before Covid-19, reflecting an aging population, declining birthrates and less immigration. The slower growth rate of the U.S. workforce could force wages higher, feeding inflation.
Wages rose about 3% annually before the pandemic. Average hourly earnings grew 5.2% in the year ended in July.
ADVERTISEMENT
Missing Workers
Slower population growth and an aging workforce don’t explain all of the U.S. labor-force losses since the pandemic, according to a Kansas City Fed analysis. About two million workers are still missing compared with estimates that account for those factors.
U.S. labor-force level and alternate projections starting in March 2020
169 million
Growth at
2015-19 pace
Dotted lines are estimates
Without impacts of
aging labor force and
declining population
growth
166
163
Without impacts of
declining population
growth
160
Labor-force level
157
154
2015
’16
’17
’18
’19
’20
’21
’22
Note: Population adjustments assume the U.S. population grew at its 2015–19 pace after February 2020. Aging adjustments assume the population shares of different demographic groups did not change from February 2020 levels.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City analysis of Census Bureau data
Roughly a million people moved to the U.S. annually in the years after the 2007-09 recession. That pace began to taper during the Trump administration and turned into a trickle after the pandemic started. The slowdown left the U.S. with 1.8 million fewer immigrants of working age—about 0.9% of the working-age population—than if pre-2019 immigration trends had continued, according to research by Giovanni Peri, a labor economist at the University of California, Davis.
Mr. Powell in a May interview pointed to the potential for reduced immigration to create a “persistent imbalance between supply and demand in the labor market.” He added: “If you have a slower growing labor market, you’re going to have a smaller economy.”
• Force 3: Energy, commodity prices. Energy and commodity firms haven’t heavily invested in new production over the past decade, creating risks of more persistent shortages when global demand is growing. When the Fed broke the back of high inflation in the early 1980s, then-Chairman Paul Volcker enjoyed some helpful tailwinds in the form of decadelong investments in oil.
Before the emergence of these three factors, the Fed could raise rates at a leisurely pace and could pursue policies that simultaneously kept unemployment and inflation low, something economists later dubbed the “divine coincidence.”
That was possible when the main threats to the economy were “demand shocks”—pullbacks in hiring, consumer spending and business investment—which slow both inflation and growth, as in the recessions of 2001 and 2007-09.
Ben Bernanke, then Fed chairman, testifies on Capitol Hill in 2008.
PHOTO: SUSAN WALSH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Fed cut rates to near zero in 2008 to stimulate economic activity, held them there until 2015, then raised them at a glacial pace by historical standards. The unemployment rate fell below 4% in 2018, and inflation stayed at or just below the central bank’s 2% target. After raising the fed-funds rate to around 2.4% at the end of 2018, Mr. Powell cut rates slightly following a growth scare in 2019.
Those experiences heavily shaped the Fed’s initial response to the pandemic in 2020. Fearing another decade of sluggish growth and too-low inflation, it cut rates to near zero and promised to keep providing stimulus even after the White House and Congress aggressively boosted federal spending.
‘Supply shocks’
Rather than reducing economic demand, the forces that emerged during the pandemic were what economists call “supply shocks”—events that curtail the economy’s ability to provide goods and services, which in turn hurt growth and spurred inflation. Covid-19 lockdowns and stronger demand for goods disrupted supply chains, as did Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the West’s financial counterassault. Labor shortages emerged across the U.S.
With supply shocks, the Fed faces a harder trade-off between growth and inflation, because attacking inflation invariably means damping growth and employment. In such an environment, “there is no divine coincidence anymore,” said Jean Boivin, a former Bank of Canada official who heads the BlackRock Investment Institute.
The Fed and most other central banks initially misread the economy because, in early 2021, price increases could be traced clearly to the effects of the pandemic, affecting a small number of goods, such as used cars. By the end of the year, however, higher inflation had become increasingly broad-based.
One measure produced by the Dallas Fed, called a “trimmed mean” annual inflation rate, which excludes the most volatile categories to capture an underlying trend, rose from 2% last August to 3.5% in January and 4.3% in June.
“This is looking like the 1990s turned on its head,” said Stephen Cecchetti, a Brandeis University economics professor. “Every forecaster back then underestimated growth and overestimated inflation systemically for almost the whole decade. Now, it looks like we’re in for the reverse of this, which will be very, very unpleasant because it means we’re suddenly going to hit trade-offs.”
A wheat field burns after Russian shelling in Ukraine in July.
PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The low-inflation environment of the past 30 years caused consumers and businesses to not think much about price increases. Fed officials now worry that even if prices rise temporarily, consumers and businesses could come to expect higher inflation to persist. That could help fuel higher inflation as workers demand higher pay that employers would pass onto consumers through higher prices.
“The risk is that because of a multiplicity of shocks, you start to transition to a higher-inflation regime,’’ Mr. Powell said on the June panel. “Our job is literally to prevent that from happening. And we will prevent that from happening.”
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
How should the Federal Reserve respond to higher inflationary pressures? Join the conversation below.
Last year, Mr. Powell suggested he was skeptical of the idea that the forces underpinning globalization would shift overnight, as Mr. Goodhart suggested. But he has given more attention to the idea in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, which has highlighted the potential for significant economic and financial fallout from geopolitical conflicts.
By sending inflation, and especially energy prices, to such elevated levels, the war could serve as a trigger “to make people realize that inflation—and quite high inflation—is a real possibility,” said Mr. Goodhart. In turn, that could weaken the public’s confidence that “everything will go back to normal.”
“The argument of central banks, that they will get inflation back to target at 2% two years from now, is becoming increasingly implausible because they’ve said that all along and, of course, they haven’t achieved it,” he said.
ADVERTISEMENT
Recession risk
The Fed’s aggressive interest-rate increases this year could be the first example of what happens with U.S. monetary policy in this new environment. Faster and bigger rate rises create greater risks of recession and could upend popular investment strategies by leading to more frequent losses for the two main components of traditional asset portfolios—stocks and long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.
The closed doors of the Pasadena, Calif., community job center during the coronavirus outbreak in May 2020.
PHOTO: DAMIAN DOVARGANES/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Fed officials have raised the fed-funds rate by a cumulative 2.25 percentage points this year, the fastest pace since they began using the rate as their primary policy-setting tool in the early 1990s. The rate influences other borrowing costs throughout the economy.
The Fed began with a quarter-point increase in March, followed by a half-point rise in May and increases of 0.75 point each in June and in July. At their meeting last month, officials debated how and when to dial back the pace of those increases, according to minutes of the meeting released Aug. 17.
An important shift occurred between Fed officials’ May and June meetings, when Mr. Powell secured consensus that they would need to raise rates high enough to slow growth. Through the summer, Fed officials have been unusually united over their goal, but if the labor market cools and the economy slows, Mr. Powell could face a trickier task forging agreement.
Several former Fed officials who have worked closely with Mr. Powell say he is likely to err on the side of raising rates too much, rather than too little, because tolerating excessive inflation would represent a much greater institutional failure for the central bank. Mr. Powell has hammered home the primacy of lowering inflation to the Fed’s 2% target.
“We can’t fail on this,” Mr. Powell told lawmakers on June 23, describing the Fed’s commitment as “unconditional.”
25-08-2022, 09:13 AM
uob share at $27.44 on 25/8/2022
https://www.theedgesingapore.com/capital...ading-days
https://www.theedgesingapore.com/capital...ading-days
05-09-2022, 10:25 AM
sti market rebounce after one long week of selling in US's market.Shortsellers take cover today
05-09-2022, 10:37 AM
柔佛印自己的钱和跟新币和brunei钱ｐｅｇ 就会比现在好很多
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/sea/story...17-1283774
https://www.163.com/dy/article/HA0RELQQ051481US.html
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/sea/story...17-1283774
https://www.163.com/dy/article/HA0RELQQ051481US.html
05-09-2022, 10:46 AM
05-09-2022, 10:50 AM
from 1 sgd to 1 myr in 1965 to 1 sgd to myr 3.195
只有独立和新加坡一起干，就有出路
只有独立和新加坡一起干，就有出路
05-09-2022, 01:13 PM
according to Philippines compnaies listing record since their companies started listed in sgx,they will jerk up the price to attract money to go in and then dump the share after three or four years after listed in sgx
Emperador Inc
0.52 SGD +0.0050 (0.98%)
today
5 Sept, 1:11 pm SGT • Disclaimer
it is time to dump the share and go back back to comfortdelgro and go into our comfort zone
Emperador Inc
0.52 SGD +0.0050 (0.98%)
today
5 Sept, 1:11 pm SGT • Disclaimer
it is time to dump the share and go back back to comfortdelgro and go into our comfort zone
05-09-2022, 01:42 PM
where the funds will flow to if FED keep hiking interest rates
https://ceoworld.biz/2022/09/05/the-worl...mies-2022/
for a start many currencies depreciates and money flow into usd as it carries higher interest rates, sgd also hike it rates so that sgd interest rates are not too far off from the usd so money will stay put in sgd instead of going into usd to earn rate up to 4% if FED continue its "growth recession" rate hikes
https://ceoworld.biz/2022/09/05/the-worl...mies-2022/
for a start many currencies depreciates and money flow into usd as it carries higher interest rates, sgd also hike it rates so that sgd interest rates are not too far off from the usd so money will stay put in sgd instead of going into usd to earn rate up to 4% if FED continue its "growth recession" rate hikes
05-09-2022, 01:55 PM
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https://www.ft.com/content/ebcac5e4-f45d...f1a944bc73
US ‘blockade’ set to turbocharge Chinese chip development
Beijing expected to unleash new funding for its domestic semiconductor sector to come up with alternatives to US tech
Leading Chinese chipmaker Tsinghua Unigroup continues to design and develop semiconductors, but the domestic industry still has a long way to go to match the capabilities of technology now being restricted by the US © Kim Kyung-Hoon/Reuters
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Eleanor Olcott in Hong Kong and Anna Gross in London YESTERDAY
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Fresh restrictions on exports of US chip technology to Chinese companies have provoked an angry reaction from Beijing, but beyond the rhetoric, China is expected to unleash a new wave of funding to boost domestic production of semiconductors.
Washington has been steadily tightening the noose on China’s tech sector, limiting access to cutting-edge chip components and machinery. Its latest move is to introduce tough licensing requirements that are likely to block sales of high-end processors from US chipmakers Nvidia and AMD, which are used in artificial intelligence systems.
China’s foreign ministry accused the US on Thursday of attempting to impose a “technological blockade” on China to maintain its tech “hegemony” and said it was stretching the concept of national security. The US has said it fears its tech will be adapted for military purposes.
Unable to break such a “blockade”, “the restrictions will turbocharge China to find local replacements”, said one senior executive at a Chinese chipmaker.
The government has already poured vast sums of money into the chip sector, with state-owned investment funds targeting chip start-ups that promise to replace foreign rivals. The largesse has prompted accusations of waste, corruption and mismanagement. Chipmaker Tsinghua Unigroup defaulted on its bonds in 2020 despite receiving tens of billions of dollars in government support.
Analysts believe a string of high-profile failures will not deter Beijing in its quest for chip self-sufficiency, as Washington accelerates the encirclement of China’s tech sector with ever-tighter controls.
Putting blocks in place for the supply of cutting-edge chips from Nvidia and AMD comes weeks after the US banned the sale to China of electronic design automation (EDA) software, needed to design high-end chips. The moves will hasten Chinese firms switching to domestic chipmakers to pre-empt being cut off from foreign suppliers, wrote Shanghai-based wealth management firm HWAS Assets in a note.
In July, the US congress approved $52.7bn in grants to build chip facilities in the US for those companies agreeing not to fund high-end semi production in China, under the landmark US Chips and Science Act.
Randy Abrams, head of Asia Semiconductors research at Credit Suisse, wrote in a note that the ban on investing in advanced fab production in China would “further limit access to overseas talent and investment to build up China’s domestic semis industry”.
In the past, chip factories or “fabs” in China run by Korea’s Samsung, Intel of the US and UMC of Taiwan “have been a good source for China to help build up IP, talent and resources to develop its domestic semis industry”, he said.
Analysts at investment bank Jefferies said the biggest customers for Nvidia products that were effectively banned this week are cloud service providers, internet and AI companies. They predicted there would be an attempt to switch to local graphics processing unit (GPU) substitutes, but the widespread use of Nvidia’s Cuda “operating system for AI” software would create incompatibility issues.
The senior executive said it was only a matter of time before China developed its own functioning EDA software. The US tools “are incredibly complex and sophisticated, so you can’t replicate them overnight, but with enough money and ingenuity, you can get close,” he said.
Others disagree that China can strike out on its own. Stephen Ezell, a director at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation in Washington, said China’s efforts to develop a “closed loop semiconductor ecosystem” had failed.
“It is self-defeating for a country in a high-tech industry to try and do everything by itself,” he said.
The devastating impact of Washington’s sanctions on Huawei, which barred the Chinese telecoms behemoth from all chips using US tech in 2020, underscores the interconnected nature of the global chip supply chain. The move crippled the company’s smartphone business.
The Netherlands has also caved in to Washington pressure and banned exports of extreme (EUV) lithography equipment to China, required to manufacture chips that power AI and blockchain technology. “China was not going to be a player once the US got the Netherlands to acquiesce,” said Douglas Fuller, an expert on the Chinese semiconductor industry.
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Even as the US successfully limits China’s access to foreign chip technology, industry insiders are sceptical about Washington’s ability to shut it out completely from the global supply chain.
One industry veteran in Japan said that the last attempt by Washington to compete with an adversary ended in failure after political appetite waned and funds dried up. In the late 1980s, the US established a consortium of semiconductor companies driven by concerns that Japan had usurped its dominant position.
“It was reasonably successful for a time, mainly because large companies like Intel supported it heavily. But government funding is fickle and dries up with the change of an administration in Washington,” he said.
“The semiconductor industry is global, and it is difficult to mount an effort to help one country be competitive against its global allies and competitors.”
Additional reporting by Nian Liu in Beijing
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/i...844906.ece
https://www.ft.com/content/ebcac5e4-f45d...f1a944bc73
US ‘blockade’ set to turbocharge Chinese chip development
Beijing expected to unleash new funding for its domestic semiconductor sector to come up with alternatives to US tech
Leading Chinese chipmaker Tsinghua Unigroup continues to design and develop semiconductors, but the domestic industry still has a long way to go to match the capabilities of technology now being restricted by the US © Kim Kyung-Hoon/Reuters
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Eleanor Olcott in Hong Kong and Anna Gross in London YESTERDAY
264
Print this page
Fresh restrictions on exports of US chip technology to Chinese companies have provoked an angry reaction from Beijing, but beyond the rhetoric, China is expected to unleash a new wave of funding to boost domestic production of semiconductors.
Washington has been steadily tightening the noose on China’s tech sector, limiting access to cutting-edge chip components and machinery. Its latest move is to introduce tough licensing requirements that are likely to block sales of high-end processors from US chipmakers Nvidia and AMD, which are used in artificial intelligence systems.
China’s foreign ministry accused the US on Thursday of attempting to impose a “technological blockade” on China to maintain its tech “hegemony” and said it was stretching the concept of national security. The US has said it fears its tech will be adapted for military purposes.
Unable to break such a “blockade”, “the restrictions will turbocharge China to find local replacements”, said one senior executive at a Chinese chipmaker.
The government has already poured vast sums of money into the chip sector, with state-owned investment funds targeting chip start-ups that promise to replace foreign rivals. The largesse has prompted accusations of waste, corruption and mismanagement. Chipmaker Tsinghua Unigroup defaulted on its bonds in 2020 despite receiving tens of billions of dollars in government support.
Analysts believe a string of high-profile failures will not deter Beijing in its quest for chip self-sufficiency, as Washington accelerates the encirclement of China’s tech sector with ever-tighter controls.
Putting blocks in place for the supply of cutting-edge chips from Nvidia and AMD comes weeks after the US banned the sale to China of electronic design automation (EDA) software, needed to design high-end chips. The moves will hasten Chinese firms switching to domestic chipmakers to pre-empt being cut off from foreign suppliers, wrote Shanghai-based wealth management firm HWAS Assets in a note.
In July, the US congress approved $52.7bn in grants to build chip facilities in the US for those companies agreeing not to fund high-end semi production in China, under the landmark US Chips and Science Act.
Randy Abrams, head of Asia Semiconductors research at Credit Suisse, wrote in a note that the ban on investing in advanced fab production in China would “further limit access to overseas talent and investment to build up China’s domestic semis industry”.
In the past, chip factories or “fabs” in China run by Korea’s Samsung, Intel of the US and UMC of Taiwan “have been a good source for China to help build up IP, talent and resources to develop its domestic semis industry”, he said.
Analysts at investment bank Jefferies said the biggest customers for Nvidia products that were effectively banned this week are cloud service providers, internet and AI companies. They predicted there would be an attempt to switch to local graphics processing unit (GPU) substitutes, but the widespread use of Nvidia’s Cuda “operating system for AI” software would create incompatibility issues.
The senior executive said it was only a matter of time before China developed its own functioning EDA software. The US tools “are incredibly complex and sophisticated, so you can’t replicate them overnight, but with enough money and ingenuity, you can get close,” he said.
Others disagree that China can strike out on its own. Stephen Ezell, a director at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation in Washington, said China’s efforts to develop a “closed loop semiconductor ecosystem” had failed.
“It is self-defeating for a country in a high-tech industry to try and do everything by itself,” he said.
The devastating impact of Washington’s sanctions on Huawei, which barred the Chinese telecoms behemoth from all chips using US tech in 2020, underscores the interconnected nature of the global chip supply chain. The move crippled the company’s smartphone business.
The Netherlands has also caved in to Washington pressure and banned exports of extreme (EUV) lithography equipment to China, required to manufacture chips that power AI and blockchain technology. “China was not going to be a player once the US got the Netherlands to acquiesce,” said Douglas Fuller, an expert on the Chinese semiconductor industry.
Recommended
The Big Read
India’s high-stakes bid to join the global semiconductor race
Even as the US successfully limits China’s access to foreign chip technology, industry insiders are sceptical about Washington’s ability to shut it out completely from the global supply chain.
One industry veteran in Japan said that the last attempt by Washington to compete with an adversary ended in failure after political appetite waned and funds dried up. In the late 1980s, the US established a consortium of semiconductor companies driven by concerns that Japan had usurped its dominant position.
“It was reasonably successful for a time, mainly because large companies like Intel supported it heavily. But government funding is fickle and dries up with the change of an administration in Washington,” he said.
“The semiconductor industry is global, and it is difficult to mount an effort to help one country be competitive against its global allies and competitors.”
Additional reporting by Nian Liu in Beijing
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/i...844906.ece
05-09-2022, 02:11 PM
05-09-2022, 03:18 PM
The property and beer thai tycoon will try to privatize its reits and consolidate into its property arm so that will interest rate cut somewhere in 2026 it can launch its logistic ,hotel reits when rate goes low again
05-09-2022, 04:37 PM
SGD/CNY - Singapore Dollar Chinese Yuan
Real-time FX
4.9351
+0.0139(+0.28%)
https://ceoworld.biz/2022/09/05/the-worl...mies-2022/
USD/SGD - US Dollar Singapore Dollar
Real-time FX
1.4059
+0.0046(+0.32%)
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/bo...trycode=bx
Real-time FX
4.9351
+0.0139(+0.28%)
https://ceoworld.biz/2022/09/05/the-worl...mies-2022/
USD/SGD - US Dollar Singapore Dollar
Real-time FX
1.4059
+0.0046(+0.32%)
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/bo...trycode=bx
05-09-2022, 04:45 PM
美国high debt servicing capabilities
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GV6OR36A053469M5.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1Opdm8BcEY
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GV6OR36A053469M5.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1Opdm8BcEY
05-09-2022, 04:48 PM
05-09-2022, 04:55 PM
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%80%BA%E...91/2162116
have to keep selling weapons and hiking rates to reduce the debts
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TBhNVVWQ884
have to keep selling weapons and hiking rates to reduce the debts
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TBhNVVWQ884
05-09-2022, 04:57 PM
interest rates can be used to weaponize against countries that are vulnarable to wild swing
05-09-2022, 04:57 PM
06-09-2022, 10:01 AM
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-stat...erest-rate
interest rate 2.5%
oil price usd88.99
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fu...electronic
if FED hike it to 4% in 2023
oil price should fall below usd 70
interest rate 2.5%
oil price usd88.99
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fu...electronic
if FED hike it to 4% in 2023
oil price should fall below usd 70
06-09-2022, 11:03 AM
european debt and energy crisis drives euro to 20 year low against usd
Please note that the more commonly used Pair is EUR/USD
USD/EUR - US Dollar Euro
Real-time FX
1.0041
-0.0028(-0.28%)
Please note that the more commonly used Pair is EUR/USD
USD/EUR - US Dollar Euro
Real-time FX
1.0041
-0.0028(-0.28%)
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