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29-12-2021, 08:54 AM
John Quiggin
John Quiggin is an Australian economist, a Professor and Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland.
29 Dec 2021 06:04AM
(Updated: 29 Dec 2021 06:04AM)
BRISBANE: US officials regularly present China as an aggressive and expansionist military power while Chinese state sources criticise the United States in similar terms.
......
Tension has been stoked by a series of myths about the South China Sea. Five of these shibboleths in particular should be refuted.
MYTH 1: SOUTH CHINA SEA IS A VITAL SHIPPING ROUTE
As is often pointed out, goods worth between US$3 trillion and US$5 trillion are shipped through the South China Sea every year, amounting to something like a third of the world’s trade.
That makes the route vital to China, and helps to explain why President Xi Jinping is so keen on the Belt and Road Initiative, the core of which is the development of land transport routes from China to Western Asia and Europe.
But, as Australian winemakers and coalminers have learned, China doesn’t need naval power to control its trade flows.
For countries other than China, control of the South China Sea doesn’t matter as much as is commonly claimed. Broadly defined, these waters include a number of shipping routes used by many countries commonly described as “vital”, such as the Straits of Malacca.
But a more accurate description would be “convenient”. The Straits of Malacca are the shortest and cheapest path between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but there are plenty of alternative routes.
In the worst case, where obvious alternatives such as the Sunda Strait were blocked, there’s always the option of Australia’s Southern Ocean.
Experience shows the closure of “vital” shipping routes, while inconvenient, has only a marginal impact on national and global economies. The shipping accident closing the Suez Canal in March was of trivial importance compared to the supply chain disruptions created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
And in the twentieth century, when the Canal was a more significant route, it was closed for years at a time due to Arab-Israeli wars.
The economic cost of disruption to shipping routes would be in the billions, not the trillions, not even enough to pay the operating cost of a carrier battle group or two.
MYTH 2: SOUTH CHINA SEA HOME TO IMMENSELY VALUABLE RESOURCES
Trillions of barrels of natural gas and billions of barrels of oil are regularly estimated to be in proved or probable reserves. But most of these are situated along the margins of the South China Sea rather than under the long-disputed islets and reefs, and the quantities are smaller than they seem.
......
the oil “would account for about one year of China’s daily consumption if it magically dropped into the Chinese market tomorrow”, and while the gas reserves are more substantial, these are only commercially viable for use in the countries alongside.
......
The stakes are, quite simply, too low.
MYTH 3: CHINA HAS THE NAVAL CAPACITY TO INVADE TAIWAN
Such claims don’t stand up to even momentary scrutiny. A seaborne invasion of Taiwan would be massively more difficult than the D-Day landings.
And China has made no serious effort to prepare for such an invasion. China has around 60 landing craft (many of them obsolete) that could transport a few thousand troops.
That might be enough to grab an offshore island, but not to invade a well-defended country of 24 million people.
......
MYTH 4: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA ARE CRUCIAL
......
The United States is determined to maintain the doctrine of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) as it applies to warships.
This doctrine is based on a disputed reading of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which the United States is not, in any case, a signatory. It is endorsed by maritime powers, which have historically been dominant, but is rejected by China.
The naval FONOPS doctrine is also rejected by India, a crucial member of the Quad grouping set up to constrain China. Even states in the region that accept the US legal position would prefer that it not be exercised.
......
MYTH 5: CHINA IS WILLING TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR OVER SOUTH CHINA SEA
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a “no first strike” policy, to which China has adhered ever since. There is no evidence that China has any intention of using nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to a nuclear attack by another power.
......
Unfortunately, these myths are not harmless. The possibility that the United States and China will somehow blunder into war is ever-present.
Full article at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commenta...an-2398241
John Quiggin is an Australian economist, a Professor and Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland.
29 Dec 2021 06:04AM
(Updated: 29 Dec 2021 06:04AM)
BRISBANE: US officials regularly present China as an aggressive and expansionist military power while Chinese state sources criticise the United States in similar terms.
......
Tension has been stoked by a series of myths about the South China Sea. Five of these shibboleths in particular should be refuted.
MYTH 1: SOUTH CHINA SEA IS A VITAL SHIPPING ROUTE
As is often pointed out, goods worth between US$3 trillion and US$5 trillion are shipped through the South China Sea every year, amounting to something like a third of the world’s trade.
That makes the route vital to China, and helps to explain why President Xi Jinping is so keen on the Belt and Road Initiative, the core of which is the development of land transport routes from China to Western Asia and Europe.
But, as Australian winemakers and coalminers have learned, China doesn’t need naval power to control its trade flows.
For countries other than China, control of the South China Sea doesn’t matter as much as is commonly claimed. Broadly defined, these waters include a number of shipping routes used by many countries commonly described as “vital”, such as the Straits of Malacca.
But a more accurate description would be “convenient”. The Straits of Malacca are the shortest and cheapest path between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but there are plenty of alternative routes.
In the worst case, where obvious alternatives such as the Sunda Strait were blocked, there’s always the option of Australia’s Southern Ocean.
Experience shows the closure of “vital” shipping routes, while inconvenient, has only a marginal impact on national and global economies. The shipping accident closing the Suez Canal in March was of trivial importance compared to the supply chain disruptions created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
And in the twentieth century, when the Canal was a more significant route, it was closed for years at a time due to Arab-Israeli wars.
The economic cost of disruption to shipping routes would be in the billions, not the trillions, not even enough to pay the operating cost of a carrier battle group or two.
MYTH 2: SOUTH CHINA SEA HOME TO IMMENSELY VALUABLE RESOURCES
Trillions of barrels of natural gas and billions of barrels of oil are regularly estimated to be in proved or probable reserves. But most of these are situated along the margins of the South China Sea rather than under the long-disputed islets and reefs, and the quantities are smaller than they seem.
......
the oil “would account for about one year of China’s daily consumption if it magically dropped into the Chinese market tomorrow”, and while the gas reserves are more substantial, these are only commercially viable for use in the countries alongside.
......
The stakes are, quite simply, too low.
MYTH 3: CHINA HAS THE NAVAL CAPACITY TO INVADE TAIWAN
Such claims don’t stand up to even momentary scrutiny. A seaborne invasion of Taiwan would be massively more difficult than the D-Day landings.
And China has made no serious effort to prepare for such an invasion. China has around 60 landing craft (many of them obsolete) that could transport a few thousand troops.
That might be enough to grab an offshore island, but not to invade a well-defended country of 24 million people.
......
MYTH 4: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA ARE CRUCIAL
......
The United States is determined to maintain the doctrine of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) as it applies to warships.
This doctrine is based on a disputed reading of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which the United States is not, in any case, a signatory. It is endorsed by maritime powers, which have historically been dominant, but is rejected by China.
The naval FONOPS doctrine is also rejected by India, a crucial member of the Quad grouping set up to constrain China. Even states in the region that accept the US legal position would prefer that it not be exercised.
......
MYTH 5: CHINA IS WILLING TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR OVER SOUTH CHINA SEA
......
a “no first strike” policy, to which China has adhered ever since. There is no evidence that China has any intention of using nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to a nuclear attack by another power.
......
Unfortunately, these myths are not harmless. The possibility that the United States and China will somehow blunder into war is ever-present.
Full article at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commenta...an-2398241
