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03-11-2024, 05:06 PM
Revolutionary warfare in Myanmar has changed fundamentally since the 2021 coup. If “network-centric warfare” often refers to technological & info advantages of conventional military forces, Myanmar there is growing “network insurgency” with patterns of cooperation & mutual support amongst multiple Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) & People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) working for one general cause them—the eradication of State Admin Council (SAC) and the surrender of the Myanmar military.
One of key theorists of insurgency evolution, Steven Metz formerly U.S. Army War College, wrote in August about “Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency”. “Next-gen insurgencies organized as networks with few concentrations of political or military power that state can target,” he said. “Onganization will survival mechanism as states develop more effective technology-based (and, in the future, artificial intelligence–based) intelligence capabilities.”
Unfortunately, junta can still targeting key insurgent personnel & infrastructure with airpower & drones, bombed HQ of EAOs, but not to any major degree—yet Metz is a schematic of direction the evolution of insurgency is taking, a generalized list of patterns of change in armed-group mobilization. Many applicable broadly to Myanmar, they suggest aspects Myanmar unique, shifting from insurgencies “emulative” to those that are “innovative”, many armed groups both want to emulate past insurgencies in some form, also learn from a plethora of mistakes older insurgencies made. Arakan Army (AA), for eg is a thoroughly unique blend of classic insurgency formation with innovative and modernizing features have been developed over past decade, they drive junta out of Rakhine State, attempt to build a new political “confederation”. The AA clearly studied past Rakhine insurgencies, was determined to become an innovative leader in contemporary Myanmar warfare. Since coup.
There has been a “Burma gap” in conflict studies, broader perspectives & comparisons are rarely used, also war in Myanmar is little studied in the broader literature on insurgency. This is why armed group formation in Myanmar needs to be more systematically studied, deeper insights are needed in their motivations, performance, tactical strategic outlooks, importantly, social interaction.
There are hundreds of strands of research by under take on armed-group formation, 3 broad features stand out, 2 positive & 1 negative—alliance building & a military-civilian fusion, & the anti-network zone of Central Myanmar.
Alliance building: One major lessons have emerged from Op 1027 in several other conflict zones is network of loose alliances between pre- & post-coup resistances. The composition forces of both stages of 1027 indicates a combined commitment to toppling the junta & defeating the military, but with more informality than rigid unity.
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commen...gency.html
One of key theorists of insurgency evolution, Steven Metz formerly U.S. Army War College, wrote in August about “Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency”. “Next-gen insurgencies organized as networks with few concentrations of political or military power that state can target,” he said. “Onganization will survival mechanism as states develop more effective technology-based (and, in the future, artificial intelligence–based) intelligence capabilities.”
Unfortunately, junta can still targeting key insurgent personnel & infrastructure with airpower & drones, bombed HQ of EAOs, but not to any major degree—yet Metz is a schematic of direction the evolution of insurgency is taking, a generalized list of patterns of change in armed-group mobilization. Many applicable broadly to Myanmar, they suggest aspects Myanmar unique, shifting from insurgencies “emulative” to those that are “innovative”, many armed groups both want to emulate past insurgencies in some form, also learn from a plethora of mistakes older insurgencies made. Arakan Army (AA), for eg is a thoroughly unique blend of classic insurgency formation with innovative and modernizing features have been developed over past decade, they drive junta out of Rakhine State, attempt to build a new political “confederation”. The AA clearly studied past Rakhine insurgencies, was determined to become an innovative leader in contemporary Myanmar warfare. Since coup.
There has been a “Burma gap” in conflict studies, broader perspectives & comparisons are rarely used, also war in Myanmar is little studied in the broader literature on insurgency. This is why armed group formation in Myanmar needs to be more systematically studied, deeper insights are needed in their motivations, performance, tactical strategic outlooks, importantly, social interaction.
There are hundreds of strands of research by under take on armed-group formation, 3 broad features stand out, 2 positive & 1 negative—alliance building & a military-civilian fusion, & the anti-network zone of Central Myanmar.
Alliance building: One major lessons have emerged from Op 1027 in several other conflict zones is network of loose alliances between pre- & post-coup resistances. The composition forces of both stages of 1027 indicates a combined commitment to toppling the junta & defeating the military, but with more informality than rigid unity.
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commen...gency.html
