[Tee tiong huat]

Continue fron above...Or most of Myanmar’s civil war since 1950s, guerrilla warfare, mostly the norm across country small unit tactics, hit-&-run ambushes, sabotage of infrastructure, occasional storming isolated hilltop bases, there also periods of semi-conventional warfare when insurgents defended major base areas & Sit Tat would assault them with divisional sized units: it was a major factor in creation of the Light Infantry Divisions in 1960s.

Offensives against Communist base areas like Bago Yoma or northern Shan State, or against Karen National Union (KNU) bases along Thai-Myanmar border, were large-scale op but brutally low-technology, as infantry war with light artillery back up often thousands of civilian porters to carry supplies. So conflict was in isolated hill & jungle country, domination of the highest summit determined advantage & supply lines.

In early days of 2021 revolution followed this model, with hit-&-run ambushes in Dry Zone & EAOs, their new PDF allies striking at isolated bases. This began to change in late-2022, most dramatically when Op 1027 was launched in late 2023, most daring coup de main in Myanmar insurgent history. The Brotherhood Alliance, comprising Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and their constellation of alliances, have been at the forefront of this evolution.

Increasingly the conflict in northern Shan, Kachin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine states are transitioning from classic insurgency to either greater conventional warfare or a hybrid of unconventional war and conventional operations. What does this mean? In Myanmar’s reality, it could be seen as both symbolic and tactical: conventional wars are usually cast as two nation states in open hostilities with each other. The SAC’s multiple protagonists are seeking forms of new political arrangements that could be seen as inter-state competition within Myanmar.